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Abstract. The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of ownership structure and cash 
flow to the non-financial firms’ dividend payout ratio listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX). The samples of this study are 63 firms over the period 2009 – 2013. 
This study conducted in panel regression analysis using the random effect model 
approach. The result of regression found that largest shareholder and government 
ownership give a positive effect to the payment of dividend. While institutional 
ownership and operating cash flow give a negative impact to the payment of dividend. 
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Abstrak. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh ownership structure 
dan cash flow terhadap dividend payout ratio pada perusahaan non-keuangan yang 
terdaftar di Indonesia Stoack Exchange (IDX). Sampel penelitian ini adalah 63 
perusahaan dengan periode penelitian tahun 2009 – 2013. Penelitian ini dilakukan 
dengan menggunakan panel regression analysis dengan pendekatan random effect 
model. Hasil regresi menunjukkan bahwa largest shareholder dan government 
ownership memberikan pengaruh positif yang signifikan terhadap pembayaran dividen. 
Sementara institutional ownership dan operating  
cash flow memberikan pengaruh negatif yang signifikan terhadap pembayaran dividen. 
 
Kata kunci: dividen, struktur kepemilikan, arus kas 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 One of the most important goals for companies in operating their business is to 
giving value to its owners. For companies that have gone public, the owners of the 
companies could be called as shareholders (investors). The companies could share the 
profit they get to the investor by giving dividend, profit reinvestment, or buyback 
shares (Mahmood et al., 2011). Another option for the investors to get profit is by 
selling their shares. They will get gain from the difference between the buy price (price 
when they bought the share at the first time) and the sell price or can be called as 
capital gains. 
 The companies usually will hold an annual meeting every period (General 
Meeting of Shareholders) and one of important thing that will be decided in this 
meeting is about dividend policy. Based on Indonesian Act No. 40 year 2007 about 
Limited Company, dividend will be giving after it has been decided in Yearly General 
Meeting of Shareholders or Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders. Dividend 
policy is about whether the companies will distribute their profit to the shareholders as 
dividend (in cash) or hold it as retained earnings to be reinvested (Hussainey et al., 
2011). 
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 One of proxies that could be used to measure dividend policy is dividend payout 
ratio (Thanatawee, 2014). Dividend payout ratio will show the comparison between 
dividend distributed to shareholders and net income (Ross et al., 2012). Taleb (2012) 
said that dividend is not only can be used to distribute companies’ profit but also can be 
used to mitigate agency problem between management and shareholders. Agency 
problem could raise agency cost directly and indirectly to the companies (Ross et al., 
2012). The direct agency cost could be cost that benefit management but not for the 
shareholders, like cost to supervise work of management. While the indirect agency 
cost could be the loss of opportunity. 
 Agency problem also can be occurred between shareholders because of the 
proportion of shares they hold (ownership structure), it is called as majority and 
minority shareholders. The majority shareholders have more control to companies’ cash 
flow (Shleifer dan Vishny, 1997) and could give effect to the amount of dividend that 
will be distributed to all of shareholders. 
 In Indonesia the definition of majority shareholders is explained in Indonesian 
Act No. 8 Year 1995 about Capital Market. Majority shareholders are shareholders who 
hold more than 50% of all of equity that have been placed to the company. 
 In other hand, the regulation of controlling shareholders is explained in 
regulation of Indonesian Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) which since 2012 to 
be Indonesian Financial Service Authority. Based on Indonesian SEC No. IX.F.1 Year 
2011 about Tender Offer, controlling shareholders are shareholders who directly or 
indirectly have at least 20% of voting rights from all of shares who have voting rights 
in a company. From this regulation, it also can be concluded minority shareholders are 
shareholders who have shares less than 20% and do not have control to the company. 
 Based on data from World Bank (2010), generally public companies in 
Indonesia are owned and controlled by some parties. The controlling shareholders 
consist of one family or one group or government. 
  Another factor that could affect dividend payout ratio based on research 
conducted by Afza and Mirza (2010) is firm’s cash flow such as operating cash flow. 
From firm’s point of view, cash generated from operational activities has an important 
role in deciding the amount of dividend. Operating cash flow can be a reliable source of 
fund to pay dividend comparing to other cash flow from investing and financing 
activities. Firm that has higher operating cash flow will pay more dividends. It indicates 
that operating cash flow will determine the level of dividend payment. 
 On the other hand, Taleb (2012) said that another cash flow that could affect 
dividend payout ratio is free cash flow. Firm could use free cash flow to invest in 
projects that have positive Net Present Value (Jensen, 1986). The higher free cash flow, 
the higher dividend payments will be expected. It means dividend could be used as one 
of way to mitigate agency problem by decreasing the inappropriate use of free cash 
flow. 
 Based on explanation above, we can see that ownership structure and cash flow 
can affect the level of dividend payout ratio of a firm. Therefore, it should be conducted 
a research to analyze whether ownership structure and cash flow also effect dividend 
payout ratio in non-financial firms which are listed in IDX. The problem statements of 
this research are: (1) Does ownership structure effect dividend payout ratio in non-
financial firms listed in IDX during 2009 – 2013? (2) Does cash flow effect dividend 
payout ratio in non-financial firms listed in IDX during 2009 – 2013? 
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THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 
Dividend policy is a policy to decide whether the companies will distribute their 
profit to the shareholders as dividend (in cash) or hold it as retained earnings to be 
reinvested. Not only that, the amount of payment of dividend and the patterns of the 
payments (annually, semiannually, or quarterly) will also be decided. This policy also 
used to decide whether the profit would be distributed as share repurchases or any other 
specific form (Hussainey et al., 2011). 
In this research dividend payout ratio will be used to determine dividend policy 
following Thanatawee (2014), Afza and Mirza (2010), and Taleb (2012). Dividend 
payout ratio can be calculated by dividing dividend per share and earning per share. 
The payments of dividend in Indonesia is regulated in Indonesian Act No. 40 
Year 2007 about Limited Company Article 70 Paragraph 1 – 3, Article 71 Paragraph 1 
– 3, Article 72 Paragraph 1 – 6, and Article 73 Paragraph 1 and 3. Dividend will be 
paid based on decision of General Meeting of Shareholders or Extraordinary General 
Meeting of Shareholders. 
 
Theory of Dividend Policy 
Dividend Irrelevance Theory. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), any 
kind of dividend policy will not give any effect to the shareholders. In this theory 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) assume investment policy is different with dividend 
policy. It makes shareholders’ value will not change when the investment policy does 
not change and increasing of dividend payout is funded by the selling of shares. 
Bird-in-hand Theory. According to Al-Malkawi (2007), the uncertainty of 
business condition and the asymmetric information between shareholders and 
management make dividend (a bird in hand) is more worthy than retained earnings (to 
get capital gains in the future). The reason behind this, if firm retains its earnings it will 
cause the uncertainty of future cash flow. It makes shareholders prefer dividend than 
capital gains. 
Agency Cost and Free Cash Flow Theory. Agency cost is cost that will rise or 
opportunity that will lose because of conflict in a firm (agency problem). One example 
of agency problem is the conflict between manager and shareholders and its relation to 
the firm’s free cash flow. According to Jensen (1986), agency problem will raise when 
manager using free cash flow for its own concern. To prevent this, firms could pay 
dividend to reduce the amount of free cash flow. From this explanation we can 
conclude that dividend can be used as one of ways to reduce agency problem between 
manager and shareholders. 
 Emery et al., (2011) says that agency problem also can occur between 
debtholders and stockholders. In this case, debtholders want to protect themselves from 
stockholders’ decision that could harm them because the increasing of debt risk. But on 
the other hand, stockholders always try to get return from their equity (dividend). The 
payment of dividend will reduce the amount of cash and the amount of owners’ equity 
or assets (because the decreasing of cash will also decrease the total assets). Even 
though the amount of owners’ equity is decreasing, the amount of debt is still the same. 
The payment of dividend will raise the proportion of asset that is financed by debt, so 
the debt ratio will also increase and will make the risk of debt increases. The increasing 
of risk will decrease the debt’s market value and it will decrease the level of 
debtholhers’ (claim dilution). 
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 To avoid claim dilution and to protect themselves, debtholders usually will 
make an agreement with the firm like dividend may be paid if the firm has paid the debt 
in specific amount or the limit of cash dividend may be paid depends on the amount of 
profit or cash flow. Ross et al., (2008) added another example of the agreement such as 
dividend may be paid if the level of firm’s earnings, cash flow, and working capital has 
reached a specific amount. 
 Informational Asymmetry and Signaling Theory. In a public company, 
asymmetric information often occurs between manager (the firm) and market. 
Bhattacharyya (1979) explained that much information about the firm is only knew by 
the manager, but not by market like the prediction of profit from project they will get. 
To give this information to market, firm will give a signal to the market by paying 
dividend. The higher level of dividend payment, makes the market will think the better 
the firm’s performance and the market will also predict that the firm will get high level 
of profit. By paying dividend a firm could give market the information of firm’s 
condition indirectly. It will make market interested in buying their shares and give 
benefit to the firms if they want to get additional equity. Al-Malkawi (2007) also 
explained that only firms with a good quality could give signal to the market by 
dividend payment because it will take an extra cost like the cost has to be paid to get 
external financing, the tax of dividend payment, or other cost due to poor investment 
decision. 
 Clientele Effects of Dividend Theories. This theory divides investors (clienteles) 
to two part based on the tax rate and transaction cost (Al-Malkawi, 2007). If the rate of 
tax is higher than transaction cost, investors will invest their funds in a firm that pay 
dividend in lower level or do not pay dividend at all. In contrast, if investors do not 
have to pay tax of the dividend payment or the tax rate is lower than transaction cost, 
they will prefer to invest their funds in a firm with high level of dividend payment. The 
same as investors who want to get capital gains, if they could not afford to pay the high 
transaction cost, they will prefer to invest in a firm with high level of dividend 
payment. 
  Life-Cycle Theory. Based on this theory, firms will pay dividend according to 
their phase in life cycle. A mature company will pay dividend because they already 
have big amount of cumulative profit but have little investment opportunities. While 
growth company usually will not pay dividend because in this phase they have many 
investment opportunities but limited source of funds, so they will retain the profit for 
reinvestment (DeAngelo et al., 2006). 
 DeAngelo et al., (2006) used retained earnings to total assets (RETA) ratio as 
proxy of firms’ life cycle. Firms with higher RETA are more mature than firms with 
lower RETA and have higher free cash flow. It makes the more mature firms will pay 
higher dividend. 
Factors Influencing Dividend Payout Ratio. Below are some factors that could 
influence firms’ dividend payout ratio: 
(a) Ownership structure. According to Thanatawee (2014), ownership structure could 
affect firms’ dividend payout ratio. In agency theory, large shareholder or majority 
shareholder will give two perspectives about moral hazard (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In one side, large shareholders (blockholders) have an important role in mitigating 
agency problem between shareholders and management. But in the other side because 
of control they have, majority shareholders could benefit their position to gain profit for 
their own. It could happen because majority shareholders also have control of firms’ 
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cash flow. This could raise another agency problem between majority and minority 
shareholders. 
 Based on the research, Thanatawee (2014) found that largest shareholders, 
ownership concentration by five largest shareholders, and government ownership 
would give positive effect to firms’ dividend payout ratio. While institutional 
ownership would give negative effect to dividend payout ratio. Thanatawee (2013) also 
found that individual investor (public investor) would give negative impact to firms’ 
dividend policy. 
 Bradford et al. (2013) also found the same evidence as Thanatawee (2014) 
about the relation of government ownership and dividend payout ratio. The higher 
government ownership in a firm, the higher dividend it would pay due to the easier 
access of capital. Then similarly with Thanatawee (2013) findings, Ehsan et al. (2013) 
also found individual ownership has negative impact to dividend payouts. The reason 
behind this could be some individual investors’ point of view arguing that dividend is 
not the instant source of fund. 
 In Indonesian case, generally public companies in Indonesia are owned and 
controlled by some people (World Bank, 2010). The controlling shareholders consist of 
one family or one group or government. It means a lot of individual investors are 
minority shareholders. Therefore to protect minority shareholders, Indonesia has 
regulated this in Indonesian Act No. 40 Year 2007 about Limited Company.  
(b) Cash flow. The first cash flow is operating cash flow, which is generated from 
firms’ business activities. From firms’ point of view, cash generated from firms’ 
operating activities has an important role in deciding dividend payments. Operating 
cash flow can be more reliable to pay dividend than two other source of cash flow like 
cash flow from investing and financing activities (Afza and Mirza, 2010). Beside that, 
operating cash flow can better reflexing firms’ performance and the level of the firms’ 
liquidity (Mahmood, 2007). As the result, firms’ with higher operating cash flow are 
expected to have better position in paying dividend than firms’ with lower or negative 
operating cash flow. According to Afza and Mirza (2010), there is a significant positive 
effect between operating cash flow and firms’ dividend payout ratio.  
 The second cash flow is free cash flow. According to Jensen (1986), free cash 
flow is surplus cash flow than can be used for investing in new projects with positive 
net present value which have been calculated by using specific level of cost of capital 
before. If firms have a big amount of free cash flow, it will raise the potency of agency 
problem to happen. 
 The amount free cash flow can be reduced by paying dividend to the 
shareholders. And this payment of dividend can reduce the possibilities of agency 
problem between manager and shareholders (Taleb, 2012). Hence, it could be seen that 
free cash flow may affect firms’ dividend payout ratio. Taleb (2012) found that free 
cash flow gives negative significant effect towards dividend ratio. It means there is 
agency problem in the sample firms of the research. On contrary, Amidu and Abor 
(2006) and Holder et al. (1998) found there is positive and significant effect between 
free cash flow and dividend payout ratio. 
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METHOD 
Mind Map Figure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Based on the literature review and mind map figure of frameworks, below are 
the hypothesis of this research:  
H1 : There is effect between ownership structure and dividend payout ratio. 
H2 : There is effect between cash flow and dividend payout ratio. 
H3 : There is effect between ownership structure and cash flow towards dividend payout 
ratio. 
 
 This research uses the data from: (1) Information and theory are collected 
through books, scientific literature, journal, article, and any other source that relevant to 
this research. (2) Secondary data is obtained by collecting firms’ audited annual reports 
and closing price during 2009 – 2013 from IDX, Thomson Reuters, and some other 
source to support this research. 
 The unit analysis of this research is organization, the non-financial firms listed 
in IDX during 2009 – 2013 and the population of this research is all of non-financial 
firms listed in IDX. Purposive sampling method has been used to get the sample with 
criteria: (1) The non-financial firms’ listed in IDX have complete audited annual 
reports during 2009 – 2013. (2) The firms have complete closing price during the 
period. (3) The firms have positive profit during the period. (4) The firms may not more 
than 1 year not paying dividend during 2009 – 2013. 
Operational Variables. Dependent variable in this research is dividend payout 
ratio (DPO). It could be calculated by dividing dividend per share and earning per share 
(Thanatawee, 2014). 
Independent Variables 
Ownership structure: 
 Largest shareholder 
• Ownership concentration 
• Government ownership 
• Institutional ownership 
• Public ownership 
Cash flow: 
• Operating cash flow 
• Free cash flow 
Control Variables 
• Leverage 
• Growth opportunity 
• Profitability 
• Firm size 
• Firm’s life cycle 
Dependent Variable 
• Dividend payout 
ratio 
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Independent variables consist of ownership structure and cash flow: (a) 
Ownership structure Ownership structure consists of largest shareholder (TOP1): the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder (Thanatawee, 2014), ownership 
concentration (TOP5): the percentage of shares owned by five largest shareholders 
(Thanatawee, 2014), government ownership (GOV): the percentage of shares owned by 
government (Thanatawee, 2014), institutional ownership (INST): the percentage of 
shares owned by bank, financial institutions, insurance companies, funds, and unit 
trusts (Thanatawee, 2013), and public ownership (PBLC): the percentage of shares 
owned by public and individual investor (Thanatawee, 2014). (b) Cash flow consists of 
operating cash flow which could be calculated by dividing operating cash flow and 
total assets (Afza and Mirza, 2010) and free cash flow could be calculated by 
subtracting net profit with change in fixed assets and change in net working capital, 
then divide it by total assets (Taleb, 2012). 
Control variables are firm characteristic that consist of leverage (LEV) using 
debt to equity: dividing total debt and total equity (Taleb, 2012), growth opportunity 
(GRO) using price to book ratio: dividing share price and book value (shareholders’ 
equity) per share (Baker et al., 2007), profitability (PRO) using return on equity (ROE): 
dividing net profit and total shareholders’ equity (Taleb, 2012), firm size (SIZ) using 
natural logarithm of total assets (Baker et al., 2007), and firm’s life cycle (FLC) using 
retained earnings to total assets ratio (Thanatawee, 2014). 
Panel Data Regression. Based on mind map, to analyze the effect of ownership 
structure and cash flow to dividend payout ratio, panel regression method will be used. 
The models are:  
Model 1 
                                                             
                 (1) 
Model 2 
                                                             
                 (2) 
Model 3 
                                                            
                 (3) 
Model 4 
                                                             
                 (4) 
Model 5 
                                                             
                 (5) 
Model 6 
                                                            
                 (6) 
Model 7 
                                                   
                           (7) 
Model 8 
                                                     
                                                   
                                       (8) 
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FINDINGS AND RESULT  
Descriptive Analysis. After conducted normality test, the total samples of this 
research are 63 non-financial firms listed in IDX who pay dividend minimum four 
years during 2009 – 2013. Below is descriptive statistic for mean, minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation every variable. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variabel Obs. Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
DPO 315 0.2615 0.7890 0.0000 0.1763 
TOP1 315 0.5502 0.9855 0.0777 0.2129 
TOP5 315 0.6783 0.9855 0.1505 0.1824 
GOV 315 0.0831 0.9003 0.0000 0.2222 
INST 315 0.0476 0.8150 0.0000 0.1284 
PBLC 315 0.3327 0.8768 0.0145 0.1903 
OCF 315 0.1020 0.3913 -1.7435 0.1432 
FCF 315 0.0099 2.9675 -0.9995 0.2139 
LEV 315 1.2177 8.2279 0.0632 1.1426 
GRO 315 1.8970 8.2096 0.0022 1.6748 
PRO 315 0.1979 1.4818 0.0001 0.1282 
SIZ 315 15.1554 19.1809 11.1959 1.5162 
FLC 315 0.3341 0.8809 0.0043 0.2030 
Source: Researcher (2014) 
 The mean value of dividend payout ratio (DPO) during 2009 – 2013 is 0.2615 
with standard deviation 0.1763. The maximum value of DPO is 0.7890 and the 
minimum value is 0.0000. Those firms did not pay dividend because according to 
Indonesian Act No.40 Year 2007 about Limited Company, firms may not pay dividend 
if General Meeting of Shareholders decided not to pay dividend to the shareholders. For 
the next sample largest shareholder (TOP1), it has mean value 0.5502 with standard 
deviation 0.2128. The maximum value of TOP1 is 0.9855 and the minimum value is 
0.0777. From the mean value, it could be concluded that most of largest shareholders of 
the samples are majority shareholders because they have more than 50% of total shares 
and they also controlling shareholders because they have more than 20% of total shares. 
Then for ownership concentration (TOP5), the mean value is 0.6783 with standard 
deviation 0.1824. The maximum value of TOP5 is 0.9855 and the minimum value is 
0.1505. For government ownership (GOV), the mean value is 0.0831 with standard 
deviation 0.2222. The maximum value is 0.9003 and the minimum value is 0.0000. 
Then for institutional ownership (INST), the mean value is 0.0476 with standard 
deviation 0.1284. The maximum value is 0.8150 and the minimum value is 0.0000 for 
most of firms in this research. The mean value of public ownership (PBLC) is 0.3327 
with standard deviation 0.1903. The maximum value of PBLC is 0.8768 and the 
minimum value is 0.0415. From the mean value it could be concluded that public 
ownership with minimum holding of shares 5% is low. It is because there is still no 
regulation about the minimum total of shares has to be owned by public in limited 
public company. 
 For operating cash flow (OCF), the mean value is 0.1020 with standard 
deviation 0.1432. The maximum value is 0.3913 and the minimum value is -1.7435. 
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From the mean value, it can be concluded the ability of firms to generate cash flow 
from their business activity is low. Then the mean variable of free cash flow (FCF) is 
0.0099 with standard deviation 0.2139. The maximum value is 2.9675 and the 
minimum value is -0.9995. The mean value of FCF is quite low, it means firms on the 
sample have low level of cash flow to be invested in future projects. 
 The mean value of leverage (LEV) is 1.2177 with standard deviation 1.1426. 
The maximum value is 8.2279 and the minimum value is 0.0632. The value of mean 
show that firms in this research not rely on debt as source of fund. For the next sample 
growth opportunity (GRO), the mean value is 1.8970 with standard deviation 1.6748. 
The maximum value is 8.2096 and the minimum value is 0.0022. Firms with higher 
level of growth opportunity tend to save profit as retained earnings. Then the mean 
value of profitability (PRO) is 0.1979 with standard deviation 0.1282. The maximum 
value is 1.4818 and the minimum value is 0.0001. From the mean value it can be 
concluded that firms have not optimize the using of equity to generate profit. For 
variable firm size (SIZ), the mean value is 15.1554 with standard deviation 1.5162. The 
maximum value is 19.1809 and the minimum is 11.1959. Firms with higher level of 
firms size are expected to pay dividend in higher level too. The last variable is firms’ 
life cycle (FLC), the mean value is 0.3341 with standard deviation 0.2030. The 
maximum value is 0.8809 and the minimum value is 0.0043. Firms with higher level of 
FLC are more mature than firms with lower FLC and expected to pay dividend in 
higher level. 
Analysis of Estimation Result . After conducted classic assumptions, it has 
been found the regression with random effect model (REM) has heteroscedasticity 
problem. To handle this problem, regression with REM and White’s cross-section 
standard errors will be conducted. Below is the estimation result for all models. 
From the regression result of ownership structure, variable largest shareholder 
in Model 1 and Model 8 gives significant positive effect to dividend payout ratio. 
Largest shareholder with mean value 55.02% who can be categorized as majority 
shareholder (because more than 50%) and controlling shareholder (because more than 
20%) have control of firms’ cash flow (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The control of 
firms’ cash flow gives positive and significant effect to dividend payout ratio. It means 
the higher shares percentage owned by largest shareholder, the higher level of dividend 
would be paid. This result is same as research conducted by Thanatawee (2014) in 
China. 
 In Model 2, shares owned by 5 largest shareholders do not give any significant 
effect to dividend payout ratio. But in Model 8 when regression was conducted for all 
of variables, shares owned by five largest shareholders gives negative and significant 
effect to dividend payout ratio. 
 Shares owned by five largest shareholders are used as proxy of ownership 
concentration. With the quite high mean value 67,83%, Harada and Nguyen (2011) said 
the firms’ monitoring should be better because it could decrease the unnecessary 
investment and increase the dividend payment. But in this research in Model 2 shows 
that the high ownership concentration does not give any effect to dividend payout ratio. 
It could be concluded the high ownership concentration does not mean the better 
monitoring and gives no significant effect to dividend payout ratio. While shares owned 
by five largest shareholders give negative significant effect to dividend payout ratio 
(Model 8) shows the bad monitoring of firms. It same as the result of research  
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Table 2. The Regression Result Using Random Effect Model and White’s cross-section 
standard errors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant -0.2696*** -0.2394** -0.1601*** -0.1752*** -0.1745*** -0.1377*** -0.1838*** -0.1088 
 (-3.2445) (-2.4765) (-3.2234) (-3.6454) (-3.3148) (-2.7863) (-3.7207) (-0.0129) 
TOP1 0.1471***       0.1866*** 
 (3.4802)       (3.0554) 
TOP5  0.0578      -0.1165** 
  (1.1248)      (-2.1303) 
GOV   0.1466***     0.1386** 
   (2.8382)     (2.2652) 
INST    -0.1147***    -0.02833 
    (-3.5230)    (-0.4666) 
PBLC     -0.0719   -0.0094 
     (-1.3256)   (-6.0919) 
OCF      -0.1973***  -0.2195*** 
      (-4.2461)  (-5.6138) 
FCF       -0.0045 0.0136 
       (-0.1562) (0.5652) 
LEV 0.0151* 0.0161** 0.0142* 0.0163** 0.0162** 0.0085** 0.0158** 0.0054 
 (1.8830) (2.0970) (1.9642) (2.0629) (2.1213) (2.1996) (2.0657) (1.0264) 
GRO 0.0139*** 0.0141*** 0.0132*** 0.0135*** 0.0140*** 0.0131*** 0.0137*** 0.0122*** 
 (7.2740) (7.6304) (8.3312) (6.6250) (7.3038) (6.3649) (6.9782) (6.6684) 
PRO -0.2989*** -0.2957*** -0.2938*** -0.2975*** -0.2960*** -0.3717*** -0.2955*** -0.3830*** 
 (-2.9605) (-2.8702) (-2.6306) (-2.8316) (-2.8919) (-4.1783) (-2.7599) (-4.5987) 
 
SIZ 0.0197*** 0.0202*** 0.0170*** 0.0191*** 0.0201*** 0.0183*** 0.0191*** 0.0152* 
 (3.0418) (2.9674) (2.8118) (3.3383) (2.9617) (3.0691) (3.3110) (2.0919) 
FLC 0.4951*** 0.5006*** 0.5006*** 0.4930*** 0.5005*** 0.5401*** 0.5047*** 0.5325*** 
 (10.9637) (10.5402) (10.7601) (10.9171) (10.5175) (9.9106) (11.2208) (10.4236) 
Obs. 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
R-squared 0.2380 0.2226 0.2353 0.2236 0.2241 0.2449 0.2190 0.2776 
Adj. R-
squared 
0.2231 0.2074 0.2205 0.2085 0.2090 0.2302 0.2038 0.2489 
Prob. (F-
statistic) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*** significant at level of 1%, ** significant at level of 5%, *significant at level of 10% 
Source: Researcher (2014) 
 
conducted by Khan (2006) in United Kingdom and Harada and Nguyen (2011) in 
Japan. 
Then in Model 3 and Model 8, government ownership gives positive and 
significant effect to dividend payout ratio. It same as research conducted by 
Thanatawee (2014) in China. It shows the higher government ownership, the higher 
dividend payment. It happens because there is regulation about dividend payment in 
public company with government ownership, Regulation of the Minister of Finance 
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Republic of Indonesia No. 5/PMK.02/2013 about Procedures for Acceptance of Non 
Tax Inclusion of Dividend.  
 For institutional ownership in Model 4, it gives negative and significant effect 
to dividend payout ratio. While in Model 8, institutional ownership does not give any 
significant effect to dividend payout ratio. 
 Jensen (1986) explained that if institutions conduct an effective monitoring, the 
cash flow could be used to pay dividend or in other words dividend is used to 
compensate the monitoring by institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). But this 
research shows that institutions do not conduct an effective monitoring, so it does not 
give any effect to dividend payout ratio even gives negative effect. According to 
Thanatawee (2014), this negative effect also indicates that institutions expropriate the 
minority shareholders’ rights of dividend. This result is same as research by 
Thanatawee (2014) in China. 
 Public ownership in Model 5 and Model 8 does not give any significant effect 
to dividend payout ratio. It shows that in Indonesia majority shareholder has more 
dominant role in deciding dividend payout ratio than minority shareholder even though 
there is regulation to protect minority shareholder, Act No. 40 Year 2007 about Limited 
Company. Minority shareholders do not give effect to dividend payout ratio indicate 
there is agency problem between majority and minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). This result is same as research by Thanatawee (2014) in China. 
 Then in Model 6 and Model 8 operating cash flow gives negative and 
significant effect to dividend payout ratio. It means the higher operating cash flow, the 
lower the dividend payment. Whereas Afza and Mirza (2010) explained the operating 
cash flow is more reliable source to pay dividend than two others cash flow, cash flow 
from investing and financing activities. But negative and significant effect in this 
research indicates there is agency problem between management and shareholders 
(Thanatawee, 2014). Management pay low dividend when the level of operating cash 
flow is high means that management expropriate shareholders’ rights of dividend. 
 Then in Model 7 and Model 8, free cash flow does not give any significant 
effect to dividend payout ratio. It is same as research conducted by Thanatawee (2013) 
in Thailand. Free cash flow does not give any significant effect to dividend payout ratio 
indicates that the amount of free cash flow is not a factor in deciding dividend payment 
to shareholders in this research. 
 For control variables firm characteristic, leverage, growth opportunity, 
profitability, firm size, and firm’s life cycle give consistent effect in all model, except 
in Model 8. Leverage, growth opportunity, firm size, and firm’s life cycle give positive, 
while profitability gives negative and significant effect to dividend payout ratio. 
 Leverage gives positive and significant effect to dividend payout ratio means 
firms with higher leverage will also pay higher dividend. It indicates firms use dividend 
to reduce debtholders’ claim of debt’s return (claim dilution). It occurs because the 
payment of dividend could reduce cash and total asset, and also owners’ equity (Emery 
et al., 2011). The reduce of owners’ equity but the same amount of debt will raise debt 
to equity ratio. The raising of debt to equity ratio will also increase debt risk and 
decrease the market value. It makes debtholders’ claim of debt could decrease (claim 
dilution). It is same as research by Thanatawee (2011) in Thailand and Taleb (2012) in 
Jordan. 
 Then, growth opportunity gives positive and significant effect to dividend 
payout ratio. It means firms with higher growth opportunity also pay higher dividend. 
As according to signaling theory, it indicates firms use dividend to give signal to the 
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market that they are having good growth opportunity. By paying dividends, the market 
is expected to be interested to invest in the firms. It is same as research by Naceur et 
al., (2006) in Tunisia and Aivazian et al., (2001) in emerging market countries like 
Malaysia, Thailand, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
 For the next variable, profitability gives negative and significant effect to 
dividend payout ratio. It means that profit is retained as retained earnings to be 
reinvested. Beside that, this result could be evidence there is lower propensity to pay 
dividend even though firms have ability to pay it (Fama and French, 2000). 
 Fama and French (2000) also explained it happens due to realization of higher 
cost has to be paid of dividend payment than cost has to be paid for selling shares to get 
capital gain to the shareholders. Based on Indonesian Income Tax Regulation Article 
23 Year 2008, the tax has to paid of dividend is 15% while based on Government 
Regulation No. 18 Year 1997, the final tax of capital gain is 0.1% of total transaction. It 
could be seen that tax rate for dividend is higher than capital gain. According to Al-
Malkawi (2007), it matches clientele effects theory which if tax rate of dividend higher 
than capital gain investors will prefer to invest in firms who pay low or no dividend. 
 For firm size, it gives positive and significant effect to dividend payout ratio. It 
shows the bigger firms, the higher dividend payment. It happens because big 
companies are having more financial stability and having more access to get external 
source of fund than small companies (Fama and French, 2000). This result is also same 
as research by Thanatawee (2014) in China and Holder et al., (1998) in United States. 
 The last variable, firm’s life cycle gives positive and significant effect to 
dividend payout ratio. Retained earnings to total asset (RETA) is used as proxy for 
firm’s life cycle. According to DeAngelo et al., (2006) firms with higher RETA are 
more mature than firms with lower RETA and will pay more dividend because they 
have bigger accumulation of profit. It is same as research by Thanatawee (2014) in 
China. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Below is conclusion from this research: (1) Largest shareholder and government 
ownership give positive and significant effect to dividend payout ratio. While 
institutional ownership gives negative and significant effect to dividend payout ratio. 
Then ownership concentration and public ownership do not give any significant effect 
to dividend payout ratio. (2) Operating cash flow gives negative and significant effect 
while free cash flow does not give any significant effect to dividend payout ratio. 
 According to the result and analysis of this research, firms (practitioners/finance 
managers) are expected to conduct good governance in operating business to avoid 
agency problem between management and shareholders because it will harm firms in 
the future. Beside that, it is because shareholders have rights to get returns like 
dividend. Therefore firms are expected to give more attention in deciding the level of 
dividend payout ratio. 
 From this research it can be seen the level public ownership (minority 
shareholders) is quite low. It may occurs because public is still not interested to invest 
their money in equity market and the socialization by related party is still not optimal. 
This research also shows the low level of dividend payment by firms. Even though 
majority shareholders give positive and significant effect to dividend payment, it would 
be better if the regulator give more attention to the level of dividend payment. The 
regulator could make regulations about dividend payment by obligating firms to pay 
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dividend if they get positive profit during specific periods and the minimum level of 
dividend payment. It is intended to make dividend as one of factors to make public 
interested to invest their money in equity market for long term and not only expected 
capital gain to get profit. 
 Before investing money in a firm, investors who wants to get dividend as 
returns should know what factors could effect the firm’s dividend payout ratio because 
there is still no regulation obligating firms to pay dividend. The factors are the firms’ 
ownership structure, condition of operating cash flow, leverage, profitability, growth 
opportunity, firm size, and firm’s life cycle. Investors also should know their rights as 
shareholders and the regulations protecting them. 
 In analyzing the effect of institutional ownership to dividend payout ratio, the 
future research could make it more detail as Khan (2006) did. Institutional ownership is 
divided to ownership by pension funds, insurance companies, other financial 
institutions, non-financial companies, and other (like non-profit organization). It is 
intended to analyze which institutions give significant effect to dividend payout ratio 
and how the effect is. 
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